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ABSTRACT 
Due to the advent of the Internet, electronic business transactions have exploded around the globe. Along with the 
Internet, wireless technology has exponentially developed as well. Today, new technologies that allow mobile (cellular) 
phones and other handheld devices to access the Internet have made wireless business transactions possible. This 
phenomenon is known as mobile commerce or M-Commerce. It has been predicted that the number of mobile phones 
connected to the mobile Internet will exceed the number of Internet-connected PCs before 2007. The mobile phone will 
therefore become the most prevalent device for accessing the Internet. Several industry analysts predict that M-
commerce will constitute a multibillion dollar business by 2005. However, M-Commerce brings new challenges in 
providing information security as information travels through multiple networks often across wireless links. What must 
be done to secure financial transactions via mobile commerce? Generally speaking, M-Commerce creates more security 
concerns than traditional E-Commerce. In this paper, security measures in M-Commerce, wireless security, and the 
application of cryptography for key generation, authentication, digital signature and digital certificate are discussed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Mobile commerce, commonly known as M-Commerce, 
‘is concerned with the use, application and integration of 
wireless telecommunication technologies and wireless 
devices’, such as Internet-enabled mobile phones, 
personal digital assistants (PDA), palmtops, laptops, and 
pagers, commonly know as handheld wireless devices 
(HWD). The discipline of M-Commerce includes 
reference to the infrastructures and electronic 
technologies necessary for wireless data and information 
transfer in the form of text, graphics, voice, and video. 
M-Commerce is a subset of electronic commerce where 
the Internet-enabled HWDs and wireless networking 
environment are necessary to provide ‘location 
independent connectivity’. It is predicted that M-
Commerce services would be the next biggest growth 
area in the telecommunications market, represent-ing the 
fusion of two of the current consumer technologies: 
wireless communications and E-Commerce [7]. 
 
Mobile communications is now considered a relatively 
mature technology with the transition from second to 
third generation (3G) wireless technology and with its 
high consumer acceptance. 3G wireless technology 
provides a variety of services and capabilities in addition 
to voice communication, such as multimedia data 
transfer, video streaming, video telephony, and full 
Internet access. 3G mobile phones provide high-speed 
data transfer and are designed to support large numbers 
of users more effi-ciently allowing for future expansion 
in user capacity. This technology was first introduced in 
Japan in 2001 and then spread in Europe and USA in 
2002. In Japan mobile commerce has been a huge 
success, accounting for over $400 million in revenues 
each year [8]. In 2003, there were about 800 million 
Web-enabled cellular phones in use worldwide. By 2004, 
the worldwide number of Web-enabled mobile phones is 
projected to rise to one billion. The M-Commerce market 
may rise to $200 billion by 2004 (Gartner Group). It has 
been predicted that the number of mobile phones 
connected to the mobile Internet will exceed the number 
of Internet-connected PCs before 2007. The mobile 
phone will therefore become the most pre-valent device 
for accessing the Internet and M-Commerce. Several 
industry analysts predict that mobile commerce will 
constitute a multibillion dollar business by 2005. 
However, once again, the question of security arises. 
What must be done to secure financial transactions via 
mobile commerce? Secure mobile commerce will be a 
key area within the expanding functionality of mobile 
phones. Generally speaking, M-Commerce creates more 
security concerns than traditional E-Commerce.  
 
2. APPLICATIONS OF M-COMMERCE 
 
There is a wide variety of applications of M-Commerce. 
For example, Smart cards with an embedded integrated 
microchip can be used as prepaid phone cards, ATM 
cards, or public transportation cards. They can be 
biometrically enhanced to include voice recognition, iris 
and face scans, and finger print authentication. In France, 
some 35 million Smart cards are in circulation and every 
year they process over three billion transactions [4]. 
Wireless banking refers to purchasing over Internet-
enabled HWDs like wireless application protocol (WAP) 
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phones or PDAs. Interactive TV is enhanced TV where 
additional content is added to an existing broadcast 
format that the viewer can query, request or even interact 
live with the program. It has reserved channels and 
bandwidth for data applications such as weather, news, 
games, or commerce. It also offers services like Video 
on Demand (VOD) or Personal Video Recording (PVR). 
Companies are providing facilities to track stocks on 
HWDs. Aspiro, a Swedish company, allow its customers 
to check stock prices or look at their portfolios and even 
trade using WAP phones or PDAs. Accessing 
information using WAP mobile phones and PDAs is 
significantly becoming popular for business-to-business 
(B2B) and business-to-consumer (B2C) applica-tions. 
Mobile and wireless technologies have been an integral 
part of defense and military ever since these technologies 
were available. In light of growing concern with 
cyberterrorism, security has undoubtedly become the 
single most important issue because many U.S. intelli-
gence services use mobile technologies and wireless 
networks for communication and commerce. 
 
3. M-COMMERCE SECURITY CONCERNS 
 
M-Commerce is bringing together two technologies, 
wireless communication and traditional E-Commerce, 
with a history of security problems. Coupled with the 
conver-gence of voice and data communications, inter-
connection with external data networks and issues 
surrounding the transactions themselves, the potential 
risks are very high [7]. There are three basic security 
components in M-Commerce: (a) Transaction: 
protecting the transaction parties and their data by 
providing an acceptable level of security, (b) 
Information: protecting valuable and sensitive 
information about customers, and (c) Infrastructure: 
protecting the network infrastructure from attack. 
 
Mobile 3D is Visa International’s new global secure 
specification that is expected to ensure the security of 
Internet payments made over mobile devices [14]. It was 
developed in conjunction with some 15 industries, 
including Ericsson, Motorola, and Oracle Mobile, and 
was launched in September 2001. It extends payment 
authen-tication initiatives into M-Commerce, enabling 
the Visa card issuers to validate the identity of their 
cardholders in real time, ensures that payment data sent 
over open networks is not compromised and allows 
consumers to actively protect their Visa accounts from 
unauthorized use, and supports global interoperability, 
enabling consumers to have a consistent and seamless 
experience regardless of the method or device being used 
to access the Internet. A number of Visa M-Commerce 
programs are currently underway worldwide to test the 
validity of M-Commerce payment solutions and raise 
consumers awareness. In Asia, Visa has partnered with 
Hutchison Telecommunications and Dao Heng Bank to 
develop a mobile payment service using Mobile 3D 
Secure. In Europe, Visa has made a strategic alliance 
with Omnitel Vodafone, while in the US, Visa and Sprint 
are working together to help facilitate secure mobile 
payments. 
 
A satisfactory level of security is required for the 
successful deployment of HWDs. To a certain extent, it 
seems reasonable to utilize solutions used for the wired 
environment in the case of the wireless environment. 
However, this approach is not always feasible because of 
the differences between the wired and wireless environ-
ments. For example, because of the hardware limitations 
of the HWDs, no large routing tables can be maintained 
on these devices, thus increasing the risk of a denial-of-
service attack. Furthermore, wireless communications 
make physical eavesdropping almost undetectable [10]. 
Similar to wired communication, wireless 
communication also needs three basic security 
requirements: (i) confiden-tiality- information is 
disclosed only to legitimate entities or processes, (ii) 
integrity- unauthorized modification of information is 
prevented, and (iii) availability- authorized entities can 
access a service provided they have appro-priate 
privileges. The mechanisms suitable to the HWD are 
discussed here. 
 
M-Commerce needs several layers of security: (i) device 
security, (ii) language security, (iii) wireless security, 
and (iv) cryptographic security. 
 
3.1 Device Security 
 
Within the design of mobile devices, there are a number 
of high quality security features. The most important of 
these are: (i) a built-in password mechanism which will 
lock after several mistyped attempts and (ii) an industry 
approved, tamper-proof smart card, known as Subscriber 
Identification Module (SIM) card.  
 
The SIM card and the mobile device are always stored 
together and the device is an every day utility object that 
is easily lost or stolen. Time-out and key-locks are often 
not used on phones. This means that as long as the phone 
remains turned on the strong password system will be 
bypassed. All WAP data, in some popular handsets, is 
stored in the phone’s memory, not in the SIM; this will 
include login and password information. These features 
certainly diminish the security of the mobile phone. The 
SIM card used in mobile devices are de facto micro-
processor and they can be used to facilitate mobile 
commerce. Gemplus SIM cards features a digital 
signature and public key encryption [11] and the 
technology is embedded in the card. In May 1999, 
Motorola, jointly with Identix, a biometrics company, 
developed fingerprint scanning devices, called the DFR 
300 that is 4.5 milli- meters thick [2]. This scanning 
device can now be incor-porated into the HWDs.  
 
3.2  Language Security 
 
If special purpose M-Commerce software, such as a 
stock trading application, is to be deployed on mobile 
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devices, then Java is the recommended language to be 
used as the deployment language on the HWDs. By 
using Java, the amount of software that needs to be 
changed in order to adopt the application to various 
mobile platforms is minimized. Feasible Java execution 
environments are available for PDAs, Smart phones, 
Communicators (such as Symbian), laptops, and other 
platforms. Maffeis [6] also recommended using server 
side Java technology, such as the Jave-2 Enterprise 
Edition (J2EE) platform, in the data center. This allows 
for shorter time-to-market and avoids vendor lock-in. 
 
3.3  Wireless Security 
 
3.3.1  WAP Security 
 
WAP (Wireless Applications Protocol) is ‘an open, 
global specification that empowers mobile users with 
wireless devices to easily access and interact with 
information and services instantly.’ WAP is currently the 
only publicly available solution for wireless 
communication and enables M-Commerce where 
Internet data moves to and from wireless devices. WAP-
enabled phones can access interactive services such as 
information, location-based services, corporate 
information and interactive entertain-ment. WAP is 
targeted at various types of HWD and Bluetooth enabled 
mobile phones.  
 
WAP 1.x security uses the Wireless Transport Layer 
Security (WTLS) protocol. This protocol is the WAP 
equivalent of Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and it provides 
authentication, encryption and integrity services. WTLS 
has three levels, all have privacy and integrity: (i) Class-
1 has no authentication (anonymous), (ii) Class-II has 
server authentication only, and (iii) Class-III has both 
client and server authentication. WTLS supports some 
familiar algo-rithms like Diffe-Hellman, RC5, SHA-1, 
and IDEA. It also supports some trusted methods like 
DES and 3DES, but it does not support Blowfish and 
PGP [9]. 
 
Since Web- and WAP-based protocols are not directly 
interoperable, a component known as the WAP gateway 
is needed in order to translate Web-based protocols to 
and from WAP-based protocols. The WAP gateway is a 
software that runs on the computer of the Mobile Service 
Provider (MSP). Thus sensitive information is translated 
into original unencrypted form at the WAP gateway [5]. 
This problem is known as WAP gap. 
 
Public key cryptography (PKC) is used to exchange a 
symmetric or private key using certificate and then all 
transmission is encrypted. A short key size of 40 bits is 
used because of power limitation. A tamper-proof 
compo-nent, know as WIM (Wireless Identity Module) 
is designed as part of the WAP architecture to store 
private data, such as key pairs, certificates, and PIN 
numbers within the mobile device. In practice, a WIM is 
imple-mented using a smart card. Wireless Markup 
Language (WML) is used in WAP 1.x technology. 
Figure 1 shows WAP gap model. 
 
 
 
Figure 1   WAP Gap Model (not a full end-to-end 
security) 
 
WAP 2.0 security uses TLS (Transportation Layer 
Security) instead of WTLS due to requiring end-to-end 
security with all IP based technology in order to 
overcome the WAP gateway security breaches. It is a 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) enabling protocol that 
provides the services such as authentication by using 
digital signatures and public key certificates, 
confidentiality by encrypting data, etc. This protocol 
uses RSA, RC4, 3DES, and SHA-1 algorithms for 
encryption. Wireless PKI (WPKI) is released for the first 
time. Figure 2 shows the WAP proxy model.  
 
 
 
Figure 2   WAP Proxy Model (end-to-end security) 
 
3.3.2  PKI/WPKI 
 
PKI systems and WTLS are at the heart of today’s 
mobile security technology. In a WAP environment 
WTLS must be translated at the WAP gateway into SSL, 
the Internet standard. A PKI is a set of policies, 
processors, software, hardware, and technologies that use 
PKC and certificate management to secure 
communication [18]. PKI’s trusted services enable the 
secure transfer of information and supports a wide 
variety of M-Commerce applications. PKI must ensure 
the following: (i) confidentiality, achieved by 
cryptography, (ii) authentication, achieved by digital 
certi- ficates, (iii) integrity, achieved by digital 
signatures, and (iv) nonrepudiation, achieved by digital 
signatures and certificates.  
 
 PKI consists of the following components: (i) Certificate 
Authority (CA)- responsible for issuing and revoking 
certificates, (ii) Registration Authority (RA)- binding 
WAP 2.0                    WAP Proxy           Web Server 
SSL/TLS SSL/TLS 
  WAP 1.x   WAP Gateway           Web Server 
WTLS TLS/SSL 
 
encryption gap 
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between public key and the identities of their holders, 
(iii) Certificate Holders- people, machine or soft-ware 
agents that have been issued with certificates and can use 
them to sign digital documents, (iv) Verification 
Authority (VA, Clients)- validate digital signatures and 
their certificates from a known public key of a trusted 
CA, and (v) Repositories- stores that make available 
certificates. 
 
WPKI is an optimized extension of traditional PKI for 
the wireless environment. ‘WPKI encompasses the nece-
ssary cryptographic technology and a set of security 
management standards that are widely recognized and 
accepted for meeting the security needs of M-
Commerce’ [18]. WPKI applications have to work in an 
environment with less powerful CPUs, less memory, 
restricted power consumption, and smaller displays. 
WPKI solutions are likely to employ “network agents” 
that take care of some of these tasks. The HWD must at 
least be able to perform a digital signature function to 
permit the establishment of a WPKI. Network agents can 
perform all other WPKI-related tasks such as validation, 
archiving or certificate delivery. Figure 3 shows a 
schematic diagram of WPKI. 
 
 
Figure 3   Wireless PKI 
 
The private keys are stored in WIM or SWIM. Two main 
components of WPKI are the PKC and the key 
certification management. In order to perform globally, 
worldwide PKI legislation is required. 
 
A number of companies, including Entrust, Certicom, 
RSA Security, VeriSign, and Baltimore, have announced 
solutions enabling the use of PKI software in a wireless 
environment. The biggest challenge in implementing a 
PKI solution for wireless deployment lies in the devices 
them-selves. With limited bandwidth and low power, a 
small screen and no keyboard, the average mobile device 
presents a number of unique problems. Certicom deve-
loped Elliptical Curve Cryptography (ECC) that reduced 
the key size from RSA’s 1024 bits to as few as 56 bits 
and made handling certificates a lot easier for low-
bandwidth and low-power devices [2]. This technique 
can process a digital signature in a second compared to 
the RSA technique, which takes almost 15 seconds to 
process a digital signature on a Palm device. Both Nokia 
and Ericsson have been supporting server certificates 
since the middle of 2000.  
 
 
 
3.4 Wireless LAN (WLAN) Security 
 
3.4.1 IEEE 802.11b 
 
The WLAN standard IEEE 802.11b provides a 
mechanism for authentication and encryption. It provides 
a maximum of 11 Mbps wireless Ethernet connections 
using the band at 2.4 GHz. 802.11b security features 
consists of security framework called Wired Equivalent 
Privacy (WEP). WEP is based on RC4, a symmetric 
stream cipher. It has a pseudo-random number generator, 
whose output is XORed to the data. WEP can use 40 or 
128 bits key size. However, using a 128 bits key size, 
802.11b throughput drops much due to heavy 
calculations. In August 2001, RC4 was announced to be 
broken and can be cracked in less than half an hour. 
Consequently, WEP can be broken. WEP with 40 bits 
key size can be broken in real time.  
 
3.4.2 Bluetooth 
 
Bluetooth technology, developed by Ericsson in 1998, is 
used to connect different HWDs and provides a method 
for authenticating devices. Device authentication is 
provided using a shared secret between the two devices. 
The common shared secret is called a link key, generated 
from PIN. This link key is established in a special 
communi-cation session called pairing. All paired 
devices share a common link key. There are two types of 
link keys: (i) unit keys and (ii) combination keys [17]. 
The link key is a 128-bit random number. 
 
A device using a unit key uses the same secret for all of 
its connections. Unit keys are appropriate for devices 
with limited memory or a limited user interface. During 
the pairing procedure the unit key is encrypted and 
transferred to the other unit. Only one of the two paired 
units is allowed to use a unit key. Combination keys are 
link keys that are unique to a particular pair of devices 
and they are only used to protect the communication 
between these two devices. Clearly a device that uses a 
unit key is not as secure as a device that uses a 
combination key. Since a unit key is common to all 
devices with which the device has been paired, all such 
devices have knowledge of the unit key. Consequently 
they are able to eavesdrop on any traffic based on this 
key.  
In every Bluetooth device, there are four entities used for 
maintaining the security at the link level: (i) the 
Bluetooth device has an IEEE defined 48-bit unique 
address, (ii) a private authentication key which is a 128-
bit random number, (iii) a 8-128 bit long private 
encryption key, and (iv) a random number, which is 
frequently a changing 128-bit number that is made by the 
Bluetooth device itself [12]. The security algorithms of 
Bluetooth are considered strong. Bluetooth standard does 
not use the RC4 cipher; rather it uses the E1, a modified 
block cipher SAFER+. No practical direct attack has 
been reported. 
 
      Wireless Device      Web Server 
WPKI                                       WPKI 
PKI Portal 
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4. CRYPTOGRAPHY 
 
The two types of cryptography currently available are (a) 
symmetric or secret-key and (b) asymmetric or public 
key cryptography (PKC). In secret-key cryptography, 
two devices must share their secret key in order to 
commu-nicate securely. Thus two concerns arise: how to 
exchange the secret key securely; and if n HWDs must 
communicate with each other, a total number of O(n2) 
secret keys must be exchanged. The management of such 
a number of secret keys should consider the scalability 
issues. 
 
In PKC, both the above problems are solved since two 
parties in the communication do not require exchanging 
any secret keys. According to this consideration, PKC 
seems to be the ideal candidate to enforce confidentiality. 
Cryptographic techniques already exist to protect data 
transmission over the Internet. The de facto 
cryptographic algorithm for digital signatures and for 
encryption of secret keys is the RSA PKC. For electronic 
commerce, it is a highly secure technique. Although 
RSA is highly secure and widely used, there are some 
potential problems with its use in M-Commerce: (i) in 
RSA the key size is large which requires a significant 
amount of memory for storage, (ii) decryption time 
increases rapidly as the key size increases, and (iii) key 
generation is complex and time consuming. Memory 
constrained devices cannot easily generate RSA keys and 
therefore may need to have keys generated by another 
system. Moreover, the computations needed to encrypt 
and decrypt messages using RSA is overwhelming 
compared to secret key cryptography. 
 
4.1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) 
 
What is really needed is a public key algorithm that 
achieves a high level of security using short keys. Algo-
rithms based on mathematical objects known as elliptic 
curves offer interesting possibilities [1]. Elliptic curve 
discrete logarithm problems (ECDLP) is defined as “give 
a base point P and the kP lying on the curve, find the 
value of k”. From cryptographic point of view, a new 
crypto-graphic system needs to be defined based on 
elliptic curves. Any standard system that relies on the 
discrete logarithm problem has a direct analogy based on 
the ECDLP. For example, Elliptic Curve Digital 
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) has already been 
standardized. Diffie-Hellman key exchange can be easily 
implemented in an elliptic curve system. 
 
Certicom promotes the use of ECC, as well as its mobile 
Virtual Private Network (VPN) client, and a client, 
which bring sophisticated security functionality to 
resource-constrained devices. WPKI ECC is recognized 
as the most optimized and therefore the best suited for 
supporting security in the wireless environment. The key 
for digital signature in ECC is 163 bits as compared to 
1024 bits in other signature schemes. However, good 
elliptic curves must be carefully chosen, otherwise it 
might be prone to various attacks. ECC is small, efficient 
and requires low power. Table 1 shows key sizes for 
ECC and RSA.  
 
Table 1 EEC Key Size compared to RSA 
ECC Key 
Size 
(bits) 
Traditional RSA 
Key Size (bits) 
Key Size 
Ratio 
109      512 1:5 
131      768 1:6 
163   1,024 1:6 
283   3,072 1:11 
409   7,680 1:19 
571 15,360 1:27 
 
Recently, ECC has been deployed on Smartcards without 
coprocessors [16]. Weimerskirch et al [15] implemented 
ECC on a Palm OS device. Their study showed that the 
normal transaction, such as a key exchange or signature 
verification, can be done in less than 2.4 seconds while 
signature generation can be done in less than 0.9 seconds.   
Table 2 shows the three major industry standard PKC 
systems that can be considered secure, efficient, and 
commercially available [13].  
 
Table 2 Three Major Industry-Standard PKC 
PKC Mathematical 
Problem 
Algorithm 
 
Integer 
factorization 
Given a number n, 
find its prime factors 
RSA, Rabin-
Williams 
Discrete 
logarithm 
Given a prime n, and 
numbers g and h, find 
x such that 
h = gx mod n 
ElGamal, 
Diffie-
Hellman, 
DSA 
EC discrete 
logarithm 
Given an elliptic 
curve E and points P 
and Q on E, find x 
such that Q = xP 
EC-Diffie-
Hellman, 
ECDSA 
 
4.2   Problems with Elliptic Curve System 
 
The true difficulty of the ECDLP is not yet fully under-
stood [1]. Recent research has shown that some elliptic 
curves that were believed suitable for ECC are, in fact, 
not appropriate. For example, if the order of the base 
point P is equal to the prime number p then it turns out 
that the ECDLP can be solved efficiently. Such curves 
are known as anomalous curves. For a given curve and 
base point, it is trivial to generate public and private keys 
(the private key is simply a random integer k and the 
public key is the point kP on the curve). However, it is an 
extremely difficult problem to generate a suitable curve 
and base   point in the first place.  
 
The main problem is how to count the number of points 
on the curve. Having done this, it is then necessary to 
select a suitable base point P, which must have a large 
order to ensure the difficulty of the ECDLP. But the 
order of P must divide the number of points on the curve. 
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Having found the number of points on the curve, it is 
quite likely that a suitable base point cannot be found. 
Users may use random curves or special curve 
generating soft-ware, such as the “Elliptic Curve 
Generation Bureau” created by Zaxus.   
 
In April 2000, the French National Institute for Research 
in Computer Science and Control announced that the 
109-bit ECC key was cracked in a four-month brute-
force effort using 9,500 computers by 1300 volunteers 
from 40 countries [3]. The amount of work required was 
about 50 times that required to solve a 512-bit RSA 
cryptosystem. The NIST has endorsed 163-bit ECC and 
WAP standards to be used in HWDs. 
 
4.3  Digital Certificates and Digital Signature 
 
In a PKC, a message is encrypted using a public key and 
is decrypted using a secret key. However, there is no 
inherent way of knowing the person who has the 
corresponding secret key. This is where the idea of 
certificates arises. Certificates confirm that the public 
key given in the certificate belongs to a private key held 
by the legitimate person, not by an imposter. To trust a 
certificate means to trust the party who issued the 
certificate, not the person for whom the certificate is 
issued. To protect a certificate from being modified one 
uses digital signatures. The message can only be created 
from the ciphertext by the private key holder. This 
provides authorization and non-repudiation. That is the 
basis for digital signature. 
 
How to protect private keys? The private key is stored in 
a Smart card, where all crypto operations with it are 
performed. The Smart card access gets restricted by the 
use of a PIN. The place where a user’s private 
credentials are stored is called Personal Security 
Environment (PSE). 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
M-Commerce security is a very crucial issue that needs 
further research to introduce efficient and effective 
solutions. In this article, various security concerns were 
expounded. ECC certainly appears to provide a viable 
alternative to RSA. There are potential advantages, 
especially when used in devices with limited processing 
capability and memory. Typical applications include M-
Commerce using handheld wireless devices. There are, 
however, some problems and issues that are inhibiting 
the widespread adoption of ECC. These include (i) the 
real security of such systems is still not well understood, 
(ii) difficulty of generating suitable curves, and (iii) 
relatively slow signature verification. Time will tell its 
future. 
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